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Numerosas economías ricas en recursos han sido mucho más dinámicas que sus similares en
América Latina y hay poca evidencia de largo plazo de que países con abundantes recursos
naturales tengan un desempeño económico inferior al promedio en general. Sin embargo, hay dos
factores que históricamente han distinguido a países latinoamericanos de experiencias más exitosas
como las de países escandinavos o Australia. En primer lugar, la deficiente capacidad “innovadora”
o “de aprendizaje” originada por la reducida inversión en capital humano e infraestructura científica
que conllevó a una débil capacidad para innovar o incluso para aprovechar avances tecnológicos del
exterior. Y en segundo lugar, el periodo de industrialización hacia adentro, que creó un sector cuyo
crecimiento dependía de rentas monopolísticas artificiales más que de cuasi rentas provenientes de
la adopción tecnológica, y al mismo tiempo, debilitó a los sectores intensivos en recursos que tenían
potencial para un crecimiento dinámico.
Abstract
Numerous resource rich economies have been far more dynamic than those in Latin America and
there is little long term evidence that natural resource abundant countries generally under perform.
But two factors historically distinguish Latin America from the more successful experiences of
Scandinavia or Australia. First, deficient national "learning" or "innovative" capacity arising from
low investment in human capital and scientific infrastructure led to weak ability to innovate or even
take advantage of technological advances abroad. Second, the period of inward looking
industrialization created a sector whose growth depended on artificial monopoly rents rather than
the quasi-rents arising from technological adoption, and at the same time undermined resource
intensive sectors that had the potential for dynamic growth.
____________________
This paper was prepared as a background paper for the Latin American and Caribbean Region’s Regional
Flagship, “From Natural Resources to the Knowledge Economy”.
E-mail: wmaloney@worldbank.org.1
I. Introduction
Raul Prebisch’s concern that resource abundance would lead to disappointing
growth performance in Latin America has found  new life in recent years.   Most notably
Sachs and Warner, using a data set spanning 1973-1995, find resource intensive exporters
grow more slowly.  This article argues that the emphasis of these investigations should
probably be on why Latin America was not able to realize the potential of its natural
resource riches that international evidence suggests exists.   A couple observations to
begin:
First, natural resources have played an integral role in the success of many
successfully industrialized countries and provide important counterexamples to those
arguing that there is a “resource curse.” The literature is clear that, many of the richest
countries in the world- Australia, Sweden, Finland, Canada, the United States based their
development strategies on natural resources and as figures 1 and 2 suggest, continue to be
net resource exporters today as measured by Leamer’s more appropriate measure of
patterns of trade, net exports per worker.
1 Latin America also offers its success stories.
Mexico’s dynamic industrial city, Monterrey, emerged from the mining boom of the 19
th
century as a processor of iron ore and steel. Colombia’s Antioquia, with its epicenter
Medallin, was also originally based on mining, and then coffee, before becoming an
important industrial center. As is frequently noted, São Paolo, if taken alone, would have
the GDP of Belgium, and it too was built on mining and coffee.
Second, growth processes take place across the very long run and probably cannot
be convincingly summarized by cross section regressions of one highly turbulent 20 year
period at the end of the 20
th century.  Maddison’s well known growth data over two
centuries suggest  that at the beginning of the century,  Latin America and other natural
resource rich countries were growing faster than either Asia or the more established
technological powers of Europe (Table 1).   As a convenient summary of the data, table 2
runs Maddison’s growth estimates on Leamer’s measure.
2  The greater temporal scope
comes at a high cost in terms of available control variables and the regressions must be
treated as suggestive only.   But across the whole period 1820-1989 there is no obvious
                                                
1 Irwin(2000) argues that the U.S. industrial success must be considered that of the most natural-resource-
rich nation that made a gradual transition to resource-rich manufacturing industries.  Innis (1933) and
Watkins (1963) had Canada in mind when they developed their “staples theory” where primary good
exports-through either demand or supply linkages—as driving subsequent industries that drove Canadian
development.    Although wool would be Australia’s most famous staple, extraordinary and continuing
success in mining and the derivative industries of both made Australia one of the richest economies in the
world in the early 20
th century, and discoveries of new deposits might put it near the top of the list again
(Wright 2001, Czelusta 2001). Blomstrom and Kokko (2001) show the importance of, especially the
forestry industry in much of Swedish development, and natural resources drove most of  Scandinavian
progress (Blomstrom and Meller 1987).
2 Leamer, for instance, long ago argued that the relevant measure should be NET exports not simple exports
to account for the fact that very open economies may not only export such products in quantity, but also
import them.  This destinction turns out to be important.  Where the extreme NR intensive countries in the
S and W are Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa, using the Leamer measure, these
are replaced by Norway, Mexico, Canada, Australia and Finland, all countries with substantially higher
long run growth rates.2
prejudicial effect of natural resource abundance and, if anything for the 130 years leading
up to 1950, natural resource abundance increased growth.  Only the post war period
arguably suggests a negative relationship, but this becomes  insignificant when a Latin
America dummy is included, a dummy that was not significant in the pre-war period.
These simple correlations suggest that the question should not be why natural resource
abundant countries did worse… they didn’t, but why Latin America in particular under
performed.
Third, the growth literature increasingly emphasizes total factor productivity as the
key determinant of cross country differences in per capita income and in growth rates, a
position that Prebisch would have been comfortable with.
3  Yet the evidence by no means
confirms his concern, or more recent skeptics
4 that natural resource based industries have
lower possibilities for  TFP growth. Even in that era, future Nobel Prize winner Douglass
North argued that “the contention that regions must industrialize in order to continue to
grow.. (is) based on some fundamental misconceptions” and the pioneer trade economist
Jacob Viner stated that “There are no inherent advantages of manufacturing over
agriculture, or, for that matter, of agriculture over manufacturing. (Viner 72, cited in
North).  Viner’s view is supported by Martin and Mitra’s (2001) estimates  of  TFP
growth in agriculture and manufacturing from 1967-1992  (see figure 3) that suggest that
for both LDCs and industrialized countries, TFP growth in agriculture was, on average
twice that in manufacturing, a result found elsewhere.
5 Blomstrom and Kokko (1991)
make a very strong case that forestry will remain a dynamic and important sector in
Sweden and Finland where rapid productivity growth ensures  competitiveness relative to
emerging producers in Brazil and Chile.  Wright (2001) and Czelusta (2001) argue that
the stock of minerals is, to an important degree, endogenous and as with manufacturing,
major increases in productivity both in discovery and exploitation could be reaped by the
application of knowledge.  Mining growth kick-started the U.S. growth success,  restarted
the Australian economy in the 1960s, and has boosted the Chilean, Brazilian, and
Peruvian economies.
The relevant question is not so much what Latin America specializes in, but why it
is that these sectors have proven more dynamic motors of growth in comparable
                                                
3 Most recently, Parente and Prescott (2000) have argued that it is not resources, nor education that is
responsible for income differences among countries, but rather differentials in total factor productivity, the
part of growth that can’t be explained simply by the accumulation of more factors of production Parente
and Prescott’s (2000) simulations suggest that a TFP level one third of the United States can explain GDP
differences of 1:27, or roughly the difference between the incomes of the highest- and lowest-income
countries in the world. Colombia, they simulate, has TFP levels of 64 percent of the United States, and 59
percent of Paraguay. Dollar and Wolff (1994)  concur that  the convergence of TFP, not of factor
accumulation, was the central force behind the catch of the OECD countries to the US in  the 1960s and
1970s.  Rodriguez-Clare and Klenow (1997) find that TFP growth was responsible for over 50% of per
capita income dispersion in 1985, and  90% of the variation in growth rates of output per worker across 98
countries over 1960-1985.
4 Most recently Matusayama, Sachs and Warner, and Rodriguez and Rodrik have argued that agriculture
has few prospects and as Wright notes, there is a bias toward seeing mineral sectors as pure extraction with
few gains from possible gains from technology.
5 Looking across the 1970s and 1980s, Bernard and Jones find TFP growth of 2.6% in agriculture as against
1.2% in industry and in only one of their 14 sample countries was TFP growth in industry. Lewis, Martin
and Savage find productivity growth higher in agriculture in the Australian economy than for the rest, and
Martin and Warr found similar evidence for Indonesia.3
countries.  Figure 3 shows that the countries on both the manufacturing and agricultural
“TFP growth frontier” are precisely those already close to the knowledge frontier:
France, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Korea.  Most LDCs, including Latin America
who have the most potential to grow quickly “catching up” to those at the frontier
perversely lag. More impressionistically, the 1944 Haig technical assistance mission to
Chile revealed the “indisputable truth that an adequate management of our forests could
become the basis for a ..great industry of forest products” yet nothing remotely similar to
the Scandinavian experience appeared until the late 1970s. Wright categorizes Latin
American countries as mineral “underachievers” and massive discoveries of deposits
throughout the region in recent years support this view.
6
Arguably, we should be looking more at barriers to technological adoption that
have prevented the region from performing as well as others.  Two areas merit focus:
First, during the initial phase of export growth, the dynamic networks of
institutions that promote innovation and the development of new comparative advantages
gradually and “organically” from their leading resource export sectors emerge far less
strikingly than in Scandinavia, Canada, the US or Australia.
Second,  the inward looking policies and focus on fomenting manufacturing in the
mid 20
th century dealt a double blow to possibilities for innovation and growth.  Not only
did they create a sector without potential for long run productivity gains, but to finance its
inefficiencies, the potential sources of growth in the resource sector were undermined.
The methodology is more “historical” or heuristic, broadly comparing the
experience of several Latin American countries with those of a  group of “beta” countries
who have had more success with resource based growth:  Australia, Canada, and Sweden
and Finland in particular.   This approach does two things. First, it attempts to look
beyond the data points in the overworked cross country regressions to see what students
of these countries have identified as critical elements of success or failure.  Second, it
establishes that Latin America was not sui generis in the concerns about dependency or
degree of suffering during the Great Depression, nor, in fact, in adopting the inward
looking policies it did.  But its response should be seen as lying at the extreme end of a
continuum that extends through Canada and Australia to Sweden at the most successful
end.  Acknowledging the similarities is vital since it prevents us from isolating the region
as some sort of rare and unredeemable case operating under separate economic laws.
Indeed the persistent Australian interest in Argentina stems precisely from its perceived
kinship and a desire to avoid its fate.  By the same logic, there was probably nothing
                                                
6 Baer (2001) notes how the recent application of satellite technology led to a vast expansion in estimates of mining
potential in Brazil relative to the stock confidently seen as fixed in the 1960s.   Previously, most mineral reserves were
though to lie in the mountain ranges of Central Brazil, especially in the state of Minas Gerais. However, massive
deposits of iron ore were discovered in 1967 in the Serra dos Carrajas in the Amazon, which was also
found to contain large deposits of Bauxite. Tin reserves now appear to exceed those in Bolivia, copper was
found in Bahia and offshore oil exploration vastly expanded available reserves of oil. In Peru, mining
exports doubled between 1992 and 1999 making it the world’s second larger silver, bismuth and tin
producer, sixth in copper and eighth in gold, but Wright argues that this is far below potential.4
preordained about the disappointments of the last half of the 20
th century -different
policies may have led to better outcomes.
II. Determinants of Capacity for Technological Adoption
The outstanding question appears to be why certain nations are able to tap into the
existing external stock of know-how and why others cannot (Baumol Nelson and Wolff
1994) or, more specifically as Amsden and Hikino (1994) frame it, why some countries,
the Nordic countries, caught up while countries like Argentina or the Phillipines stumbled
back.   Argentine economist Guido Di Tella (1985) phrased the issues as more one of a
historical dynamic,  noting a continuum of countries’ abilities to move beyond a state of
exploiting the pure rents of a frontier or extraction of mineral riches and beyond
“collusive rents” offered by state sanctioned  or otherwise imposed monopoly.   Referring
to the closing of the Argentine frontier, he argues:
This kind  of area of new settlement was bound to see its rates of
growth falter after initial colonization.  Argentina behaved, to some extent,
in this fairly predictable fashion.  But the same was not true for the other
countries.  It must be acknowledged that the ability of the United States,
Canada and Australia to continue a process of vigorous growth even at the
end of the expansion of the frontier has been a most extraordinary feat,
and one that could not be take for granted… At that point the successful
cases were able to move to a quasi-rent based stage-early for the most
successful of all, the United States, less so for Canada and Australia, and
rather later for Argentina;  further development for the United States and
Canada was more clearly based on innovation and less so in Australia.
For Argentina it arose exclusively from collusive quasi-rents.  To the
extent that development was based on innovation, these countries were
switching to an alternative and unlimited source of growth.  To the extent
that it was based on collusion, it opened up a limited, alternative path.” (Di
Tella 1985 p 51).
The distinction between entrepreneurs being driven to appropriate the quasi rents
arising from arbitraging innovations abroad, vs. exploiting artificially created rents is
critical and taps into a long literature searching for the barriers to innovation and the
adoption of technology.
7 Most recently, Parente and Prescott (2001) argue that the reason
cross-national TFP differences persist, in spite of an immense stock of global knowledge
that offers ready quasi-rents to any less-developed country (LDC) entrepreneur, is the
existence of monopolistic structures that prevent new entry and ratify labor’s
intransigence in the face of job-threatening new technologies. Their simulations suggest
that the impact of such barriers far exceeds the few percentage point differences in GDP
accounted for by counting the Harberger triangles of traditional static models or, for that
                                                
7 We use “ innovation” not only to refer to the process of generating new knowledge, but to making the
necessary adaptations to externally developed techniques.5
matter, differences in education.
8 Their analysis echoes Albert Hirschman’s (1958)
broader point that in an uncompetitive situation such as the one posed by the guild
system, “an innovation in producing a given commodity could only be introduced by
someone who was already engaged in its production by the old process….[T]his fact
would, in itself, militate against many innovations that might render painfully acquired
skills useless and valuable equipment obsolete…”
9 Similar effects can appear due to
concentrated credit markets that only lend to insiders, foreign exchange shortages that
simply inhibit access to technology, and explicit trade barriers.
The Importance of National “Learning” Capacity.
But contemporary theory and economic history also suggest the importance of
factors that actually encourage and facilitate the adoption of new technologies by
developing national “innovative” or “learning” capacity”. Stern, Porter, and Furman
(2000), Romer (1990), Nelson (1993), Wright (1999) are among the increasing number
who seek to explain the factors determining the flow of innovation in terms of the
interrelationships of a variety of social institutions and actors.
“Mining” Wright would argue about the US mining success, “was fundamentally a
collective learning phenomenon” (1999 308) incarnated in intellectual networks linking
mining universities, and both government and private research.  From the initial
investments in exploration techniques, to training mining engineers and geologists, in
fomenting a metallurgical revolution. For instance, the development of electrolytic
processes in the 1890s was essential to the later development of copper and aluminum.
Before WWI, the US would have the world’s highest level of human capital and boasted
the worlds best mining institutions, with the University of California at Berkeley and the
Colombia Mining School as preeminent. The case of Australia, suggests that a similar
process of collective learning could be replicated later in a small peripheral economy.
Most notably Australia’s “transparent earth” initiative, a collection of numerous
technologies that permit looking through the first kilometer of the earth’s crust, have put
them at the forefront on modern mining discovery and processing technologies, and
Australian significant exports of mining expertise (environmentally friendly extraction,
mine closure techniques) point to the development of industries less tightly linked to
minerals themselves.  Wright identifies the lack of the human capital and knowledge
infrastructure as precisely the roots of the problems of mineral underachievers.
Blomstrom and Kokko argue that knowledge networks or clusters of universities
and private and public think tanks are the key to further productivity growth and
development of new products and are “perhaps the main strategic and competitive asset
of the Swedish forest industry.” Even in the mature pulp and paper industry, most firms
devote considerable resources, roughly 4% of value added, to research in the industry’s
institutes and there is ongoing upgrading of human capital through in-house education.
This has maintained competitiveness, generated new uses for forest resources, and the
development and leadership of environmentally correct forestry practices.   But such
                                                
8 Hall and Jones (1999), after controlling for differing levels of education, still find differing levels of log
TFP highly correlated with log of output per worker with a correlation coefficient of .89.
9 Hirshman p. 57 (1958)6
clusters, by virtue of  preparing  firms to identify and exploit unforeseeable technological
opportunities can have far greater impacts on national development. It was precisely the
human capital and knowledge clusters that linked Nokia’s former excellence in forestry
(Nokia was the site of Finland’s earliest pulp mill) to its present leadership role in
telecommunications.  Focusing on these types of linkages, rather than the more
mechanistic conceptions of clusters (see Ramos, for example) based on product similarity
probably makes more sense as a development strategy.
These examples suggest that a concentration in natural resource intensive sectors
per se is probably not at the root of Latin America’s growth disappointments, but rather
the inability to take advantage of the productivity gains that are possible in all sectors.
III. Deficient National Learning Capacity?
Harvard historian David Landes in his encyclopedic Wealth and Poverty of Nations
sees the divergence of the two paths of Latin America and Scandinavia dating from the
differing reactions of northern and southern Europe to the phenomenon of British
industrialization.  The literature is uniform that Scandinavia was poor at the beginning of
the 19
th century, but had laid the groundwork for rapid growth.  They enjoyed high levels
of literacy, excellent higher education and Landes argues that they were “equal partners
in Europe’s intellectual and scientific community…They also operated in an atmosphere
of political stability and public order.  .. Property rights were secure; the peasantry was
largely free; and life was a long stretch of somber hard work broken intermittently by
huge bouts of drinking and seasonal sunshine.  …”(248-252)
To this Landes offers the dramatic counter example of Mediterranean Europe, in
particular of Italy, Spain and Portugal, hurt by political instability and a religious and
intellectual intolerance with roots in the reconquista and counter-reformation. Further,
Spain in the 18
th century was a resource-rich nation that used its fantastic returns from
silver and gold mines in the new world to purchase all that was needed, developing a
rentier mentality rather than that of a nation of  hands on tinkerers, such as appeared in
Britain, the U.S. and Scandinavia.  Landes argues that this cultural Dutch disease was
exported wholesale to the New World.
There is no shortage of Latin observers disposed to self-flagellation far more severe
than Landes’ critique. As an example, Pinto (1959) in his Chile, a Case of Frustrated
Development is only the best read of a line of critics of aristocratic dandyism and
indolence as the root of Chile’s stagnation and dependence on foreigners.
10 Nor, in the
                                                
10  Monteon summarizes the underlying critique that “The economic ideal of the nineteenth century
remained that of a rentier-someone who makes his fortune in one quick speculation and thereafter lives on
land rents or some other long term yield.  Domingo Sarmiento in 1842 referred to the effect of this ideal on
native entrepreneurs: southern hacendados and northern mine –owners left their affaires in the hands of
supervisors and moved to Santiago where they ‘tried to imitate or rather parody the European Aristocracy.”
(Monteon 14.) This critique finds an even earlier expression in Juan Jose Santa Cruz  who  in his
“Reflections on the Economic State of Chile in 1791” saw the potential with a small outlay of displacing
the British fishing and whaling activity off the Chilean coast.  But he lamented the introduction into the7
light of extraordinary expenditures on luxury goods, is there much willingness to accept
financial considerations as binding constraint on growth. 
11
But there must be some tempering of the condemnation of the entrepreneurial
mettle of the Chilean elite, and that of the region more generally. Pinto is also clear that
the elimination of Spanish restrictions on trade caused Chilean exports to boom
immediately after and this was the case throughout the continent. Chilean entrepreneurs
were the second largest presence in Peruvian nitrate fields, ahead of the  British, and
pioneered copper mining in their home country. When the price of copper rose in the
mid-19
th century, production by Chileans increase four fold from 1844-1860.  In response
to increased demand rising from the Gold rushes in California and the US, Chilean wheat
exports rose ten-fold in value from 1848-1850.
12  Southern Hacendados borrowed heavily
to clear lands to expand acreage three-fold from 1850 and 1870 (Conning 2001.  More
generally, Cariola and Sunkel (1985) offer a vision of global dynamism of the early
nitrate economy, not, in fact as an enclave in the Norte Grande, but one eliciting a strong
response of Chilean entrepreneurs throughout the economy. In general, local talent
proved very responsive in certain well-trodden sectors and would earn global acclaim
across history in non-technical sectors including two Nobel prizes in literature, a major
surrealist painter, and first-class musicians.
Arguably, the disappointing growth of Latin America had more to do with a lack of
supporting infrastructure for learning and innovation that would enable local
                                                                                                                                                
Colony of “luxury, ostentation and expensive tastes” and saw no permanent improvement in the economic
conditions of Chile as possible as long as the population remained improvident and susceptible to
sumptuous living (Will p 57).  The theme again recurs in Marcial Gonzalez 1874 speech “Luxury our
Enemy”  where he argued that the cloths, jewels, coaches and statues exceed those  found anywhere else in
America.
 Pinto cites the historian Francisco  Encina, “’If half of what we have wasted in the last 40 years or
invested in luxury we had applied to buying Nitrate mining machinery or to setting up the copper industry,
to irrigating our fields.. the position of Chile in America would today be different.’ The propensity to save
and invest was not, then, the most striking virtue of our community”75
11Though Pinto acknowledges some, although almost certaintly not enough, of a role for corruption, “what
was decisive was the absence of local individuals and groups interested in developing, on their own, the
nitrate riches.”57   In fact, although Chilean capital finance was very important, the British had dominated
the Nitrates industry in Peru and Bolivia and had substantial marketing networks.  This made them the
natural agents to continue mining once these lands were taken by Chile.  Monteon also argues that the
global condemnation of Chile’s imperialism may have induced a strategy of dividing the world community
by offering Britain a sweet deal.  In any case, it appears that the British were aware of a government plan to
allocate ownership on the basis of who owned the Peruvian titles.  This inside information allowed them to
purchase shares at a discount and emerge as owners.  A question does emerge as to why Chilean capital
was so willing to sell and to why it did not protest more after the fact. One of the earlier Chilean nitrate
pioneers, Jose Santos Ossa petitioned that given this dearth of local entrepreneurship, the government take
over the job, but the minister of the interior replied that the state would be corrupted by such an
undertaking and that it was better to leave it to private interests, implying, foreign capital.  This may have
been due as much to an embrace of classical liberal economic values during the period as much as any
Catholic hangover, but Pinto seems less convinced.  “The decision of the managing groups of the country
to ‘live from the rents” of the industry”56  and not play the Schumpeterian entrepreneurial mid-wife would
cost the country, not only in income foregone, but also in expertise and dynamism that Pinto argues let
foreigners dominate in every field of domestic endeavor.
12 Encina, Historia de Chile XIII, 486 cited in Will (1957)8
entrepreneurs to innovate and hence stay abreast of competition than any rentier
temperament   inherited from Spain.
The foundation of  technical absorptive capacity: Literacy
Recent thinking suggests that Latin America’s persistent inequality may have had a
role to play in slowing the region’s ability to adopt foreign technologies.
13  Engerman and
Haber (2000) argue that the  period of sustained economic growth during the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries that distinguished the US and Canada  from the other  New
World Economies was fundamentally due to the patterns of settlement and crops that led
to a relative unequal distribution of income in the slower growing areas.  This
concentration preserved the political influence of the advantaged elites and  marginalized
much of the population measured as lower access to the franchise, natural resources,
financial institutions, and property rights as well as primary schooling,.
The marginalization in education may have been particularly important. The
concerns with social control, extreme inequality of income, weak public finance, and
perhaps an intellectual commitment to a small state, all led to dramatically smaller efforts
in Latin America toward universal education than the successful natural resource
exporters made. As Figure 4 suggests, more than 70 percent of the population age 10 or
above in Australia,  United States and Canada and Sweden, were literate, three times the
percentage in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Cuba, and four times the percentage in
Brazil and Mexico. By 1925, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica would attain
literacy rates of over 66 percent, while Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia,
Bolivia, Guatemala, and Honduras would hover at 30 percent until much later (Mariscal
and Sokoloff 2000).
As Engerman, Haber and Sokoloff (2000) note, this is particularly important given
that early industrialization reflected the cumulative impact of incremental advances made
by individuals throughout the economy, rather than being driven by progress in a single
industry or the actions of a narrow elite. As one manifestation critical to the development
of innovation, they note that the greater equality in human capital accounted partially for
the high rates of invention in the United States overall, but also that the more general
concern with the opportunities for extracting the returns from invention contributed to a
patent system which was probably, at the time, the most favorable in the world to
common people. This stands in stark contrast to Mexico and Brazil, where patents were
restricted by costs and procedures to the wealthy or influential, and where the rights to
                                                
13 The Scandanavian countries did not start with an egalatarian Tabula rasa.  In the 18
th century, Danish
land with in the hand of a few thousand families on large estates tilled by serfs and only 23 percent of rural
households owned land in Finland.  But as Blomstrom and Meller argue, “what laid the foundation for the
Scandinavian transformation to modern wealthy societies were the agrarian reforms” 6 that ranged in
timing  from  Denmark’s precocious beginnings in 1788 to Norway and Sweden’s in the 1850s and
Finland’s of the 1920s that created small and medium sized privately owned farms.  As with the relatively
equal distribution of land in Canada (Watkins 86 Armstrong) and the US,  Blomstrom and Kokko argues
that the  “it is hardly possible to over-emphasize the importance of the improvement in agricultural
productivity for Swedish industrialization which facilitated transfer of labor and made possible exports that
generated capital for investment in forestry and manufacturing in addition to providing a local market.”9
organize corporations and financial institutions were granted sparingly, largely to protect
the value of rights already held by powerful interests” (p. 17).
Blomstrom and Kokko argue that in Sweden, the introduction of a mandatory
school system in 1842 and emphasis on literacy and numeracy was essential for the
ability of individuals and firms to learn and adopt new technologies: much elementary
learning and technology transfer was based on written instructions like blue-prints and
handbooks. This also suggests that the extensive literature comparing Argentina and
Australia may be missing a critical point.  Despite a strong feeling of “there but for the
grace of God go we” on the part of Australian authors, it is very clear that, in the mid 19
th
century, Australia was far closer to the industrialized countries in levels of  literacy.
This, in a country that until the 1840s was a penal colony of the UK.
14 The story of the
global conglomerate Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP), started by a boundary rider on a
sheep station, suggests the importance of a broad base of literate everymen to run with
ideas and enjoy supporting institutions.
Technical Education: The Critical Lag
A central theme of Blomstom and Kokko’s account of the Swedish growth
experience is the early abundance of high level human capital--the “impoverished
sophisticate” Sandberg (1979) called it.  The Universities in Uppsala and Lund date from
the 15
th and 17
th centuries and technical schools were established in the early 1820s.
Other institutions, such as the Swedish Academy of Science date to 1739 and the
Swedish Ironmaster’s Association to 1747 which published a mining science journal in
1817 and financed foreign study trips by Swedish engineers and scientists.   New
engineering workshops established for construction of iron bridges and lock-gates of the
Göta canal served as training centers.  Sweden possessed the fundamentals of a modern
engineering industry by about 1850 (Ahlström 1992)) and was exporting engineers by
1900.  Similarly, by that year, serious research in chemistry was undertaken at the
University of Oslo that would lay the foundation for the dominant fertilizer,
electrochemical, and electrometallurgical industries in Norway.
15 As in Britain and the
US, Scandinavian mechanization was a slow process that implied ongoing accumulation
of know-how, continuous interaction with the outside world, and extraordinary
contributions at the technological frontier.
16   The exceptional long run performance of
Swedish firms established during this period, Blomstom and Kokko note, “has been
                                                
14 Free, secular and compulsory education was established beginning with the Victoria Education Act of
1872.
15 Hveem (1991)
16Very early on, Scandinavia was exporting know-how in the form of its own émigrés toward tsarist Russia
for example, where Alfred Nobel was one of the pioneers of the infant petroleum industry.  To a significant
extent the expansion of manufacturing during the first decades of the twentieth century was based on
Swedish innovations-steam turbines, centrifugal separators, ball bearings, the adjustable spanner, the safety
match, air compressors, automatic lighthouse technique, various types of precision instruments, techniques
for precision measurements and so forth (1974 p 5.) Lindbeck . The great companies known today were
built on innovations in these areas. Ericson (1876) telephone, Alfa Laval (1879) the separator; ASEA
*1890) electrical equipment 1907  SKF (bearings) (Amsden).10
based on the ability of Swedish industry to create, adapt and disseminate new
technologies.”
By contrast, the Colonial period in Latin America enforced a negative intellectual
bias in many ways that exactly discouraged the adaptation of foreign innovations. Most
countries had a local franchise of the Inquisition and, largely for reasons of political
control, the icon of intellectual discourse, the printing press, was banned in Brazil until
1809 (Baer 2001).  The  Spanish crown kept out non-Spanish and non-Catholic
businessmen, traders and craftsmen and thus deprived new world of important skills and
knowledge.
Further, the nature of education in Latin America was less technical than that found
in Scandinavia or the English ex-colonies. Spanish higher education was largely
religiously based and focused on law, philosophy, and theology, and somewhat less
respectably, medicine and this pattern  was replicated in the colonies. The Spanish
enlightenment after 1750 saw the establishment of groups of autonomous sociedaded
economicas that sought to diffuse technology from abroad and establish libraries
throughout the country, and some Royal Societies emphasizing applied science. But
Spain began training engineers seriously only in the 1850s, and by 1867 had only one
Escuela de Ingenieros Industriales, located in Barcelona.
17
Latin America necessarily lagged behind Spain and Portugal in developing a
technical class. In both Chile and Colombia specific royal initiatives gave the initial
impetus to scientific inquiry in the last decades of colonization.
18 However, as  Will
(1957) documents for Chile “With the exception of the inadequate facilities provided by a
few religious organizations, there did not exist…before the middle of the eighteenth
century an institution capable of furnishing the youth of the colony with the barest
essentials of a secular education (17).” Similar stories are found throughout the region:
 19
recurring political instability silenced prominent scientists and undermined fledgling
universities, fiscal weakness prevent consistent financing of the sciences, and the
unreliable demand for local engineers prevented the career from being lucrative, let alone
socially respectable.
A corps of locally trained engineers emerged by the end of the 19
th century in many
countries, but arguably, this was little and late. As table 3 suggests, Australia had  at least
5 times the numbers of Chile or Colombia in 1920 and Meredith argues that by 1926,
Australia had 27 times more graduates of technical schools per capita than Argentina,
perhaps the most educated country in the region. And to repeat, in this period,
Scandinavia was exporting engineers innovating at the frontier.  The persistence of this
deficit,  measured as the percentage of architects and engineers per worker continued into
the 1960s: Sweden (5.03), Finland (2.52) Denmark (1.03) compared to Argentina (.55),
Chile (.7), Educator (.18), Uruguay (.42).
20  Further, it is not clear  how good the quality
of the Latin product was.  At the end of the 19
th century in both Colombia and Chile,
                                                
17 Riera I Tuebols (1993)
18 See Will (1957); Safford (1976)
19 See Safford for Colombia, Villalobos (1990) and Greve(1938) for Chile, Baer (1969)  for Brazil
20 OECD (1969) Occupational and Educational Structure of the Labour Force in 53 countries11
local engineers complained that the government and private firms preferred to import
engineers from France or the US even for fairly straightforward tasks.
Does This Really Matter?
The US, Scandinavian and Australian literature strongly supports the idea that
such technical capacity, and more generally the ability to learn from abroad was critical
to accessing technological progress abroad, and, in the long run, the establishment of
knowledge clusters. And there are some provocative examples from Latin America.
Perhaps the first bit of evidence is the extraordinary dependence on immigrants as
innovators and entrepreneurs in new sectors. Industrialization in Mexico in the late 19
th
century would be almost entirely undertaken by the resident foreigners  (drove the growth
boom of the Porfiriato (Hansen 1971). Using machinery from the homeland, the French
started the textile industries in Veracruz and Puebla (Buffington and French 1999) and
foreigners also started Mexico’s first iron and steel plant, the Fundidora de Fierro y
Acero de Monterrey, in 1903, that would build on the region’s ore deposits and anchor its
industrial development. Hansen argues that there were entrepreneurial spillover effects
that drew many Mexicans into the capitalist ranks, but the initial impulse came from
foreigners.
Collier and Sater also note the influence of immigrants in introducing new
industry and technologies in Chile. Immigrants set up many of the industrial enterprises
of the 1860s and 1870s:  36 of the 46 dressmakers counted in 1854 were French;
Americans installed the flourmills; Americans and British built railroads.  Loveman
(1979) notes the list of officers and member of the executive committee of SOFOFA, the
principal organization of industrialists showed the disproportionate influence of
immigrants “Only three Spanish surnames accompanied those of the other members of
the directorate: Edwards, Subercasseaux, Hillman, Tupper, Tiffou, Mitchell, Gabler,
Lanz, Klein, Muzard, Lyon, Bernstein, Crichton, Osthous, Stuven.” (193).
Fogarty tells a similar story for the development of  Argentina’s “super staple”,
beef where a small group of hacendados, recently arrived from Europe, formed the
Sociedad Rural Argentina in 1866.  This group spearheaded the transformation of the
Pampa, improving the quality of livestock, pastures, and methods of animal husbandry
necessary to take over the US position as principal exporter of cattle to Europe by the
WWI with dramatic forward and backward linkages throughout the economy.   He also
notes that while in the US, Canada and Australia railroads were sponsored, financed and
constructed largely by nationals, in Argentina, Europeans were the prime movers.
In each of these major sectors in three countries, it was not locals who saw the
possibilities for technological arbitrage, as was the case in Scandinavia, but those
embodying the knowledge from abroad.
As important is the importance observers present and contemporary put on the
impact of engineering schools, such as the  Antioquia  Escuela de Minas as critical
providers of talent for emerging industry (see, among others, Safford).  In Brazil, Baer
(1967) argues that despite a tradition of iron smelting dating from the mid-16th century,12
the techniques used at the end of the 19th century were primitive: of the 30 ironworks in
the headwater region of the Rio Doce in 1879, only seven used Italian forge methods and
the rest used the old African cadinho technique.  The critical event for the development
of the native steel industry Baer sees as the foundation in the same year of the School of
Mines at Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais that led to the establishment of the first new blast
furnace since the failures of the beginning of the century. Graduates of the Escola de
Engenharia do Exercito, established in 1930, would lead the steel industry as it
developed through the 1960s.
Australian observers also put great emphasis on the role of non-university
innovation infrastructure in explaining the disparate evolution of the wheat industry in
Australia, Canada  and Argentina.  In all three countries, wheat had an early and firm toe-
hold, but it became the super staple in Canada, largely due to government assistance to
prairie agriculture in the form of experiment stations, seed testing services, and technical
assistance.  Again, these efforts also came on top of massive efforts in Canada and
Australia to achieve widespread literacy in the prairies that have no analogue in Latin
America. There was also provision of other important less knowledge related  public
goods: public granaries and a wheat grading system provided quality control which gave
Canada an edge over Argentina’s wheat which had the reputation for inferior quality and
lack of uniformity.
21 But the provision of an extensive institutional and scientific
infrastructure was recognized as key to their success by contemporary Argentines and
contrasted with the lackluster efforts of the Argentine government.
Mining in Chile and Australia
The interaction of deficient local technical capacity and reliance on foreigners led
to Chile’s loss of leadership in copper over the course of the last two centuries and goes
some way towards explaining why Australia’s BHP, hailing from an antipodal
dependency of similarly small size would discover la Escondida and be the major force
in expanding Chilean production in the 1980s and 1990s.   Chile, saw its world share fall
from one third to under 4% by 1911 and even by 1884 the Sociedad de Mineria openly
wondered whether Chile’s copper mines would survive at all.  (p. 139)  Collier and Sater
(1996) attribute this largely to a  failure to update technology in the face of declining ore
quality and excessive reliance on the wasteful piriquJn, system. Chilean historians date
this technological slippage to the beginning of the 19
th century when they note that there
was little diffusion of European technologies and that “the work of mining was not very
systematic.”   With the disappearance of the Academy of San Luis, there was no technical
teaching of mining in the country and the “receipt of industrial innovations was slow and
without visible influence.” (Villalobos 96)  Charles Lambert, representative of a British
mining company in La Serena and trained in the Politechnique in Paris noted the poor
                                                
21 As an illustrative pseudo experiment, Fograrty cites that fact that the same year that  Spanish Merino
sheep were introduced into New South Wales, Australia, a flock was introduced to the River Plate region.
European capital was available for sheep breeding in both areas, and both suffered the ups and downs of the
world wool market.   However, in 1885, the two countries had the same number of sheep, but the average
“clip” was getting almost twice as much on the world market in Australia as in Argentina due, not only to
differences in wool types and quality, but inferior yields per sheep.  The differences he attributes to the
innovation and visions of individual figures, rather than any structural features of the economy.13
mining practice, scarce knowledge of minerals, and inefficient smelting, all of which
represented poor technique relative to that employed in Europe.  The Polish mining
engineer,  Ignaci Domeyko, in 1841 helped establish a small school and in 1847, the
University of Chile would begin to teach engineering.  But Chile was, at this point, 80
years behind the first mining school in Europe,  and even 50 years behind Mexico.
 Chilean historians note the dominance of foreigners in applying new
technologies
22 and Pinto spectacularly underlines how Chile tragically passed up the
power that gradual accumulation of know-how offered to maintain competitiveness and
dynamism.
….the technological demands of the period, in contrast to what is occurring today
in some areas of mining or  industries, were relatively modest and thus not too
costly.  What could and had to be done in the national mining companies and in
agriculture, except in certain exceptions… was perfectly compatible with the
resources accumulated in the long periods of bonanza.  If the process had been
initiated and maintained adequately, without doubt, it would have created the
means to confront more challenging tasks, such as those posed by copper mining
when it was necessary to exploit less rich veins.   However, faced with the
technological revolution, the local mining companies had behind them neither
sufficient accumulated resources, nor the organizational or administrative capacity
that were indispensable.  In these circumstances, there was no other option but the
introduction of foreign capital and expertise at a cost, without doubt of a
considerable retribution.  71.
We can imagine a bad feedback loop where  inability to innovate leads to lower
profits and less experience and hence further inability to innovate that may have led Chile
to a bad technological transfer equilibrium that would eventual push local entrepreneurs
them out of the market.  Perhaps this accumulated deficiency of technical facility was
what led to a self-perception that Chileans were perhaps “unfit for the modern era.”
Tancredo Pinochet Le-Brun, granting that Chileans were inferior to Europeans, still
wondered “don’t we have minds in this country that can go to Europe to learn what
professors, whom we have imported and continue importing, have studied? Are we truly
incapable of steering our own ship?”  Francisco Encina, in  Nuestra Inferioridad,
answered pessimistically in 1911, on the now clearly specious grounds that the high
content of indigenous blood that made rapid catch up to Europe unlikely.
23  One can
imagine a sense a frustration among concerned Chileans that, in fact, the big and visible
advances were in the Guggenheim mines at el Teniente and Chuquicamata, a French steel
mill ”El Tofo” in Coquimbo, and experiments in fishing by foreign capitalists (Monteon
75).
                                                
22 “ It is worth noting that the empresarial spirit united with the motivation to apply  new techniques was
almost always the result of initiatives of foreigner who came to chile and saw opportunities to develop or
solutions to problems with practical experience.  They brought and had a greater tradition of information,
spirit of action, attention to detail and urgency to capitalize the on the results or resources generated, which
was not common trait of the average inhabitant of the country whose nature of work was  little developed
beyond the artesanal level. (Villalobos et. al. 1990 p  99).”
23 In La conquista de Chile en el siglo XX (1909) cited in Monteon (p 62).14
Chile would continue to slip in its technical capacity in Copper.  Meller argues that
“in the 1950s one could have learned more about Chilean copper in foreign libraries than
in Chilean ones…Neither was  there training of Chilean engineers and technicians
specializing in copper.” The fact that, in 1952 the Controller General admitted that he had
no idea of what went on in the companies( Moran) suggests that part of the feeling of
vulnerability and dependency must be attributed to the lack of technical capacity to
monitor and confidently critique the actions of the Gran Mineria.
24 It was not until 1955
that the Copper Department was created to oversee U.S. firms’ copper operations and a
bureaucracy of Chilean professionals, engineers, economist and the basis for a local
Chilean expertise.  “In short, it took about forty years, from 1925-1965, to develop a
domestic capacity to analyze the role of copper and to educate Chilean professionals and
technicians in the management of the [large copper firms].” (Meller 1991). This is a
striking statement in a country that began exporting copper long before the U.S. or
Australian firms that would dominate the Chilean industry. Even today, there is relatively
little interaction between the copper companies and universities or other think tanks. As
Such a knowledge cluster, Lagos (1997) argues may be necessary to transform the North
into a regional service center after the inevitable decline in mining production over the
next decades.
Australia’s trajectory was very different. While most mining was begun by
Cornishmen who had a high degree of applied skill, in 1886 Australia recruited highly
paid engineers and metallurgists from the US, and this firmly linked the country to the
innovations generated in the US (Wright 1999). Diaz Alejandro would note that
Australia’s mining exports provided a general interest in scientific and technical research
absent in Argentina. Duncan and Fogarty argue that  "geological knowledge and mining
expertise became part of the Australian heritage enriched by schools of mines of world
class and the industry has been in the forefront in the development and application of
mining and treatment technology." (Duncan and Fogerty 129). Although far ahead of
Chile, Australia lagged the US until after 1920 in engineers per 100 thousand population,
47  vs. 128, but would reach 163 by 1955.  Several important universities could offer
local beach heads for foreign research.   The Sydney Mechanics Institute was established
in 1843 and the Sydney Technical College in 1878, both with the goal of the diffusion of
scientific knowledge.  The University of New South Wales  was founded  in 1949  on the
campus of the Technical College with  MIT and the Berlin University of Technology as
models and a core focus on research and teaching in science and technology.  The UNSW
School of Mining Engineering  now ranks as one of the largest educators of mining
engineers in the world.
25
 In this context emerged one of Australia’s most influential mining companies and
industrial conglomerates Broken Hill Proprietary Company LTD (BHP) in 1883.   Called
                                                
24  An interesting parallel can be found here in the Balkans which Landes argues were- “societies that did
not generate enterprise from within.  Trade and money were for Greeks, Jews, Armenians, Germans.” 252
Here also, arose, independently, a school of dependency affiliated with Manoelescu  that shares many
characteristics with that articulated by Prebisch.  (See Love 199?)
25 http:// www.mines.unsw.edu.au/school.htm; http://unsw.edu.au/about/about_history..html15
by those of the region “the cradle of Australian industrialization”
26 Broken Hill saw the
expansion of mines and smelters would expand and in 1893 the establishment  of
Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy.  When the easy to access oxide zone
was exhausted, Broken Hill metallurgists and engineers among others developed the
flotation process, which, as a residual, allowed the expansion of zinc production by new
firms. During WWII,  Australia, as the principal ally in the pacific, benefited for demand
for iron based goods and transfer of technology. Industrial production rose by 45% in the
war period and technological acquisition jumped, a gain which subsequent Australian
governments would seek to continue.   BHP and similar conglomerates became modern
corporations with vertical control from mining to blast furnaces to wire rope factories to
shipping lines with links to foreign capital through joint ventures.    BHP gained global
reach, acquiring mines in Utah and Canada and Chile.
IV. ISI as a Double Disincentive to Innovation:
A Continuum of Experiences
The barriers to trade and investment that comprised the inward looking policies
implemented after the Great Depression stand as the second  impediment to the transition
to a innovation based economy and offer a rationale for the  negative post-1950 Latin
American dummy in the growth regressions.  Di Tella’s distinction between
entrepreneurs being driven to appropriate the quasi rents arising from innovations abroad,
vs. exploitation of artificially contrived rents is not new, but highlights why the natural
resources/manufacturing debate probably misses the point. It is not that you have created
a manufacturing  sector, but whether you have created a source of innovation,  or a brake
on the dynamism of the traditional sectors who are forced to subsidize it. Blomstrom and
Meller capture much of the ISI critique when they argue that
When Latin America decided to force industrialization by import
substitution, it was not  an industrialization based on the countries’
endowments that was supported.  While the Scandinavian countries slowly
and gradually filled in the empty slots in their input-output tables, the
Latin American countries filled in all the numbers at the same time; and
even worse, they tried to fill in the U.S. numbers!  Suddenly there were
several small Latin American economies with production structures
similar to that of the United States.(p 9)
                                                
26 New South Wales Department of Mineral Resources (2001) http:// www.minerals.nsw.gov.au/silver.htm.
This section also draws on http://www.bhpbilliton.com/. And mining, in turn, enriched the educational
network.  A product of the gold rushes, the University of Melbourne was founded in 1852 as a specifically
secular university to assert the city’s equality with Sydney University founded in 1852. It opened in 1855
with faculties in Mathematics, Natural Sciences and in the early 1860s added Engineering along with the
Latin favorites, Law and Medicine.16
Not only were these sectors out of line with comparative advantage and walled off from
competition and the source of innovation, but they would need to be subsidized, or at
least would divert attention from sectors that had the potential for innovation.
However, Latin America’s turn inward and suspicion of resource dependency is at
one end of a continuum that passes through Australia and Canada and then to Sweden.
As a crude proxy, figures 5-7 suggest that virtually all of the sample countries saw an
increase in average effective  tariffs after the Great Depression.  Latin America’s average
jumps from .22 to .34 while those of our beta countries move from .1 to .16.  Within the
latter, however, Australia is as dramatic as Brazil, Mexico or even Argentina and
arguably Canada could pass for Latin across much of the period.
The usual battery of protectionist measures appeared and from observers in these
countries we hear exactly the critiques of inward strategies so familiar in Latin America.
Dehem’s (1962) cite of  the Hirschman quote above about barriers to innovation was
employed, not to explain LDCs, but  Canada’s “stunted growth” of the 1950s, a theme
picked up by Stykolt and Eastman (1960) seeking to explain the 30-35% differential in
US and Canadian incomes and low labor productivity.  One of the Deans of Canadian
economic history  Melville Watkins (1963)  ended one of his better known article noting
the “the emphasis increasingly placed by economists on the link between the inefficiency
of Canadian secondary manufacturing industry and the Canadian tariff.”
Prolonged Australian protection  also remains the general culprit in most analyses
of that country’s lackluster industrial growth in this century (Anderson 1987 Maddock
and McLean 1987). Fogarty argues that Australia’s tariffs probably were responsible for
the stagnation of the industrial sector in the late 1920s, precisely when Argentine
manufacturing was growing well.  Although it did have an indigenous automobile
industry of some promise, and BHP type conglomerates with solid roots, Australia and
New Zealand would also would nurture import substituting industries that were neither of
efficient scale or appropriate given comparative advantage.  McLean (1989) and
Anderson (1987) conclude that ongoing protection of the manufacturing sector (into the
1970s  “led to a stifling, rather than promotion of desired structural change to no
reduction in the dependence on natural resource-intensive exports, and to lower growth
and living standards.” 22.
That the policy of other natural resource abundant countries would parallel that of
Latin America is not so surprising.  Many of the factors cited in the canonical recounting
of the reasons for the region’s turn inward are found elsewhere.
The Great Depression, the watershed for inward looking policies appears to have
affected the beta countries as hard as Latin America.  Figures 8-10 and 11-13  show that
the beta countries were far more open than Latin America, most were exporters of raw
materials and most showed falls in export earnings as large as those seen in Latin
America.  Latin America appeared to recover more slowly, especially Colombia and
Brazil who suffered most by the fall in coffee prices, but some, such as Argentina, are not
distinguishable from the other sample.17
   Table 4 suggests somewhat conflicting measures of actual impact.  On the one
hand, the reported falls in per capita output follow the continuum: Latin America hit
hardest, then Canada and Australia, and least affected, the Scandinavian countries. Yet
the resulting unemployment rates, although notoriously incomparable, suggest that even
the impact on Scandinavian countries was very high, roughly doubling during the
Depression to levels between 20% and 30%.  Meanwhile Argentina remained relatively
unscathed at  under 5.6%.  Supporting evidence suggests that the general picture is
broadly correct. Aldaheff (1985) cites  the Review of the River Plate as arguing that
Argentina was one of the least-if not the least-hard hit to be found anywhere in the world,
an impression confirmed by Alejandro Bunge, a prominent industrialist, in 1932 to
London’s Argentine Club. 
27 Further, that both the lower need for “safety net”
expenditures  and the fact that the British carried the railway debt implied that  Argentina
would have far fewer fiscal problems than either Australia or Canada as well.
28
At a deeper level, the region’s concern with asymmetrical power relations in the
world economy can be heard elsewhere. As Love (1996) argued, the Rumanian Mihail
Manoilescu independently developed a dependency theory that strikingly parallels that of
Prebisch to explain the evolution of east-central Europe.  Foreign control over the
economy emerges as a theme in even the most successful economies. In 1909, 80% of
Norway’s mining, 85% of its chemical 44% of its paper and textile, and 33% of its metal
industries were foreign owned and foreign control of almost 75% of all waterfalls
essential to power generation generated widespread protests. Finland’s extraordinary
dependence on Russia as a Grand Duchy and extraordinary debt service repayments from
1945-48,  5-6% of GDP (139) is high by even 1980s Latin standards.  At Australia’s
centennial in 1880 a sizable fraction of the population, many the descendents of imported
convict labor, resented the dependence on the UK. The Republican newspaper Bulletin
argued that the convict “chains of iron are merely exchanged for chains of gold” and
citing the exploitive nature of British capital investment,  argued that it was better to be
poor and independent, referring to Chile and Mexico as enviable examples. (Hughes 1987
509)
29 Canada surely can share Mexico’s traditional lament about being so close to the
U.S. and so far from God.  The percentage of the value of production that was produced
by U.S. controlled and affiliated companies in 1932 ranged from 39% in iron and
                                                
27 Sodersten testifies to the traumatic levels in Sweden as well.
28  This also implied that fiscal problems during the Great Depression would be minor in Argentina
compared with Canada or Australia.   Both the lower demands of supporting the unemployed, and the fact
that the railways, which ran major losses in all  three countries, were largely in private hands in Argentina
where in both Canada and Australia they had far larger public participation, lessened the impact on some
Latin states.  Aldaheff suggests that half of Canada’s budget deficit in 1932/33 and 34/5 were dedicated to
financing.   Real expenditures between 1928/9 and 1933/4 rose 66% in Canada, 46% in Australia and only
10% in Argentina.  Further, in terms of managing external debt, debt service was calculated at 17%, 22%
and 23% for Argentina, Australia and Canada respectively and per capita indebtedness was 167 pesos vs.
863 and 224.  Argentina’s repayment record was excellent across the period and it was Australia, who had
over-borrowed in the 1920s, had the most trouble servicing the debt.  In sum, all three countries shared
conservative, and reasonable fiscal management in the face of shocks, but the Latin American entrant was
relatively better off.
29 These same themes would continue through history and would surface over  American ownership of
Australian mines, which had risen to 41% by 1967, and agriculture in the 1960’s and 70s and would peak in
virulent objection to the war in Vietnam, and a reaction against Yankee Imperialism that featured
prominantly in  the 1972 labor campaign.18
products to 63% in non-ferrous metals including electrical apparatus.  (Marshall,
Southard and Taylor 1936 cited in Wylie 1990). Some observers cited the “satellitic”
nature of tariff jumping US industries as responsible for their low rate of innovation.
 There are clearly important differences that are being elided here.  But the fact is
that in many ways these economies were similar and they would react to perceived
dependency in the same way Latin America did.  Wynia (1990) sees far more similarities
than differences in “Opening Late-Industrializing Economies: Lessons from Argentina
and Australia”   Analyzing the difficulties of shifting away from a “rent-seeking”
approach he sees both economies as attempting more merciful and less costly industrial
revolutions, by relying heavily on government regulations and controls, and contrived
economic rents. He is careful to note
None of this is confined to Latin America.  Rent-seeking economics is not derived
from that region’s patrimonial political traditions or Hispanic affection for
corporatist ways of doing politics. .. Rather it was a strategy chosen by authorities
in nations that were, at the time that economic modernization was accelerated,
already too activated socially and politically to permit less politically self-
conscious approaches to economic renovation (187). …The Australians were not
radically different from the Argentines in their approach to the protection of
industry and labor. … They were guided by sentiments of nationalism and
nativism, stressing the nation’s defense against competition from cheaper labor
and/or more powerful foreign economies. 188
The reaction was one of dependent countries seeking both to diversify away from
the natural resources that maintained a dependent relationship and which appeared to
have taken them down during the great depression.  Locating the region along a
continuum is important since it shows precisely that the Latin American countries are not
rare species operating under special economic conditions or laws but are firmly members
of the “late industrializing resource-rich countries” phylum. They share similar liabilities,
but arguably similar possibilities for growth.
However, figures 5-10 also suggest some critical differences.  First, the
Scandinavian experiment with protection reached levels attained by the Latin Americans
only at their most open.  Second, most of the beta countries reduce rates pretty much
across the board and most all below .1 by 1950.  By contrast, the Latin series are far more
volatile and show no consistent trend toward decrease through the end of the 1980’s.
Average openness series suggest a similar pattern- the beta countries also became more
closed in the 1930s and 1940s, but by 1950 had retained their previous levels and even at
their most closed were far more open than their Latin counterparts who, by 1989 still had
not recovered their 1895 levels.
Indeed, the greatest departure from the ISI trajectory is arguably Sweden who
maintained low tariffs and an aggressive outward orientation throughout the post war
period.  Sweden’s labor dynamics are highly suggestive of the importance of resolving
distributional issues early and bringing labor on board to a countries position along the
policy continuum.  Hjaalmarsson, in his  The Scandinavian Model of Industrial Policy,
finds the anchor of this policy in the attitude of Swedish Trade Unions who, “as early as19
the 1920’s strongly promoted a productivity enhancing industrial policy, emphasizing the
rationalization of firms” that placed a premium on continual renewal of technology, plant
organization and machinery.  The 1951 policy document of the Confederation of Trade
Unions stressed competition to increase productivity and forcing less-efficient firms out
of the market combined with active labor market policies to reallocate displaced workers.
In the 1950s, the confederation was resolutely free trade, strongly criticized government
protectionist measures and “argued that tariffs would decrease productivity growth since
it would protect stagnating and less competitive industries.”  The importance of this case
is precisely that it shows that that there were alternatives to managing resource abundant
economies the way that Latin America did.
Industrial Drag on Natural Resource Development
The same continuum of effects is found surrounding the second innovation
impeding effect of ISI: industrialization policies, to greater or lesser extent, were
implemented on the backs of the traditional exporting sectors.  Possible productivity
gains and growth more generally were stymied by price incentives that and a general
inattention to the primary sectors that undercut their dynamism.
Again, the Scandinavian and US cases testify to the possibilities  of  sustained
development building on resource endowments.  Australian observers again see their
country as an intermediate case, where the lesser degree of their turning away  from
traditional exports constitutes the critical difference from the Argentine case.  As
Australia encouraged investment in petroleum and refining and electrical equipment in
the post war period, it initially neglected the rural sector, which grew at only half the rate
of population growth.  This led to debates about the logic of stimulating secondary
industry to the detriment of its comparative advantage whose lagging performance, it was
argued, had led to the country’s periodic BOP crisis.  Agricultural policy was reversed in
1952 with granting of investment subsidies, extension of credit, price stabilization
programs, and extension of research and extension programs that led to  a doubling of
production over the next decade.
 Argentina, across the same inward looking period of the 1940s-50s, inflicted
permanent damage on its traditional leading sector, driving output growth to .2% per year
and leaving the country perilously close to ceasing to export food stuffs.  This
combination of inefficient industrialization with the demise of its traditional export
sectors left it exceptionally vulnerable and prey to the cycles of boom and bust
characterizing the region.  Australia would continue to suffer from a mild cycles of boom
and balance of payments crisis ( and required IMF assistance in 1952). But a rebirth of
interest in traditional mining sectors in the 1960s led to increased dynamism in the
resources sector that may lead Australia to 4
th in per capita income in the near future
30
                                                
30 Nonetheless, there are concerns.   Dowrick and Nguyen, argue that, once allowances made for
initial conditions, post-war Australian growth not worse than oecd more generally 28 Mclean, however,
most growth due to factor accumulation and not TFP.  The recent debate between X and Krugman on a
similar finding in Singapor suggests that this is not necessarily critical, but the US switched at turn of
century and Scandanavia would become more “knowledge led” after WWII.  1980s- debt accumulation put20
despite inattention to the continuing inefficiencies of the ISI strategy that wouldn’t be
addressed until the 1980s.
Chile Redux:  Fruit Redevivus
Lest the magnitude of neglect or taxation of the traditional sectors be under
appreciated, it is worth going into some detail again, on the case of Chile that
aggressively undertook the public good and pro-innovation policies found in the
successful natural resource exporters, but would find them undermined by policies
toward the industrial sector.  The promethean efforts of Chilean Development
Corporation (CORFO)  founded in 1939 and growing to control 30% of total investment
laid the foundations for the dynamic export industries of the next-half century.  Much as
Wright documented was the case in the US, it financed and promoted prospecting for
Gold, silver, manganese and iron.  To develop the fishing industry CORFO contracted
technical assistance missions, established a marine biology station near Valparaiso in
1945, granted sizable tax exemptions in 1952, and joined the army and the University of
Chile in surveying the coastal waters in 1954.  It took the first inventories of forest
stocks, and contracted the 1944 Haig technical assistance mission to examine the forestry
sector.  In 1953 it financed processing plants for cellulose and newsprint. In the fruit
industry as well, CORFO financed technical assistance missions, extended credit for
cultivation and experimental plots, and invested in supporting infrastructure and in 1941,
it financed efforts to promote exports of wood products and wine.  Throughout the 1950s
and early 1960s CORFO had established an experimental fishing stating in Arauco,
financed construction of modern boats and dock facilities in Tarapaca and Valivia, and
founded fish canneries and fishmeal mills.  The World Bank-financed Paper and Carton
Manufacturing Company in Bio Bio stimulated paper and cellulose-related forestry
activities after 1957.
CORFO may have been correct, in  boasting on its 20
th birthday , of Chilean history
being divided in two eras, that before the construction of the Huachipato iron works near
Concepcion in 1947 and that after  transformed the region an important center of
manufacturing. But early on,  local observers wondered at the costs.  A compilation of
seminars given in the business community in 1954 entitled Negative Aspects of Economic
Intervention: Failures of an Experiment praised CORFO’s irreplaceable role in creating
the electricity and fishing industries, but derided the gross inefficiency of Hachipato and
the National Petroleum company and saw the capriciousness of exchange controls as the
overriding disincentive to needed foreign investment.  The halving of export volume over
the previous decade, the stagnation of agriculture, and the frustration of Chile’s
tremendous potential in vegetable and fruit exports were laid at the feet of irrational
intervention in the price mechanisms and the persistently overvalued exchange rate
(Correa Prieto 1954).
In the 1960s, recurrent balance of payments crises would lead the Christian
Democratic Government of Eduardo Frei  in Chile to  seek to promote non-traditional and
                                                                                                                                                
large claim on export revenues, negative tot evolution, and long standing structural problems become
critical.21
traditional exports. Yet, Chile’s areas of natural comparative advantage were stymied by
the gross protection and inefficiencies that were the logical culmination of a system of
protection and incentives that had mutated into literally incomprehensible degrees of
distortion.  Jeanneret (1972) a researcher at CEPLAN at the Catholic University  noted
that in 1965, “the multiplicity of instruments used, and the frequency with which they
were modified, had arrived at such extremes that it was humanly impossible to have a
clear vision of their final impact by sector or for the economy as a whole.” She found
effective rates of protection extreme by global standards, ranging from –100 to 650
compared to -50 to 500 for Brazil, -25 to 200 for Malaysia, and –17 to 106 for Norway.
These heavy negative rates of protection implied that ten of twenty one manufacturing
industries studied could export only at a loss and that “some of these sectors, principally
wood, paper, paper products, fish and other  minerals , would have become, perhaps,
significant exporters. (Jeanneret 1972)  A contemporary observer, Marko Mamalakis also
wondered at the inability of the agro-export industry to grow, given that export demand
for raw or processed Chilean fruit, seafood, oils, wine and so forth [was] almost
unlimited.” (Mamalakis 1976).
 That these disincentives to invest and innovate were critical is borne out by
subsequent history. As well known, the history since 1975 was one of relentless pursuit
of integration with the world economy and a correction of the distortions accumulated in
the previous decades.  In the next 20 years, non-copper exports increased by a factor of
10 essentially eliminating the traditional foreign exchange bottleneck to industry. The
most dramatic story occurs in the fruit sector where exports would grow at a rate of 20%
annually in the first 20 years since the reforms of 1974.  Areas planted to commercial
orchard almost tripled and fruit production quadrupled as did the number of fruit
entrepreneurs.
 Jarvis (1992) attributes this success to the rapidity with which Chileans were able
to transfer, adapt and extend fruit technologies initially developed for California and
other fruit growing regions to Chile.  CORFO, again, had played an important role in the
early 1960s in laying the foundations for this  boom as did the 
31 ten year program for
cooperation with the University of California, and University of Chile established in 1965
to permit technical cooperation and improve graduate training. This helped the University
of Chile to develop first-rate faculty in fruit-related sciences and to begin modern fruit
research.  But Jarvis is also clear that most of the initiative in these areas post
liberalization were privately funded and driven by changes in price relationships and
                                                
31CORFO’s interventions included analysis of potential demand to establishing a  in surveying existing
fruit orchards, analysis of potential demand in foreign markets, elaboration of production goals,
introduction and screening of new varieties, establishment of nurseries to propagate disease-free plants,
construction of cold storage facilities at strategic locations to promote post harvest care, phytosanitary
inspection of exported fruit, establishment of favorable credit lines and working capital and “drawback”
payments for fruit exports.   In 1964 Chile establish the National Institute of Agricultural Research which
paid relatively higher salaries and attracted more skilled researchers and INIA initiated a fruit research
program.  By these means, Chile developed the scientific personnel and knowledge to achieve
technological transfer; identified and began to plant new varieties suitable for foreign markets; improved
orchard and post-harvest management; upgraded fruit research and teaching; developed the infrastructure
necessary to export fruit to foreign markets.  Several export companies emerged that gained experience
with foreign markets.22
industry structure that increased returns to private R & D.  Further down the innovation
chain the number of university theses on fruit submitted in Agricultural Engineering from
1976-80 to 1986-1990 increased by a factor of 2.5. Though Jarvis expresses concerned
that private provision of a non-excludable good might not be a likely as profits to the
industry are eroded,  there can be no question that story  of the renaissance of Chilean
fruit  is one of innovation made profitable by eliminating a bias against the sector.
In Conclusion
The logical question is why Latin America occupies the extreme of the continuum
sketched here.  Though beyond the scope of this paper, much of the explanation lies in
political-economy dynamics- timing of the mobilization of urban classes and
modernization of the rural areas, the form of integrating new actors in traditional power
structures etc.-  and these receive attention, particularly among Australian observers.
Further, if the data in table 5 are to be trusted, Latin America may have suffered a greater
fall in income.
However, in keeping with the general focus on national learning capacity and
adoption of knowledge from abroad, three angles are suggestive.
First, the necessary degree of protection to preserve or  jump start industries is
likely to be a function of their ability to innovate as fast their foreign competitors.    The
Swedish forestry industry does not seek protection from Brazilian and Chilean exporters.
But it is perhaps not surprising that 19
th century Brazilian iron smelters using archaic
cadinho technologies complained of competition from more modern producers abroad,
despite the high shipping costs.  A lower “national learning capacity”  would dictate
higher necessary levels of protection to have a comparable stimulative effect.
Second, the same deficiency in national learning capacity may have implied
reliance on technological on foreign actors that implied a greater sense of dependency
and additional suspicion of natural resources.  It is likely that had Chile had the capacity
to monitor the Gran Mineria in the 1950s, it would have enjoyed a stronger bargaining
position and a greater confidence in copper as continuing growth industry.
Finally, innovation in economic knowledge may depend on the same factors.
Between low levels of general literacy and the same weakness in tapping into foreign
advances, Latin America may have been less familiar with the laws of economics and
sound management than the beta countries. Duncan and Fogerty argue that Australia
emerged from its traumatic period of Depression unemployment with a renewed
commitment to economic management and state intervention. But, it retained the
professionals from business and the universities who had successfully managed war
production and directed them toward maintaining post war prosperity.  There was a
fundamental  belief in the need for a technically sound basis for economic management
and a commitment to remaining engaged in the world economy. In Sweden, Jonung
(1992) notes how unusually involved professors of economics were and remain in public
life.  Globally renowned figures such Cassel, Heckscher, Ohlin, and Wicksell were
frequent government advisors, promoters of public debate, and even parliamentarians.23
But this was the same era when Peron dismissed tecnicos like Raul Prebisch and argued
that “there can be nothing more elastic than the  economy” and that economists’ alarmist
warnings should be ignored.  The latter suggests that this is point should probably not be
overstressed.  Time and time again, in the region, the macro-basics are firmly understood
by key actors, but the political conjuncture overrode their advice.  Nonetheless, it is
remarkable to hear many of the present cohort of Latin American leaders, in the face of
vast international evidence, again recurring to policies that will guarantee only that over
the long run, the region will remain far from the innovation frontier.24
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Argentina and Australia,” Policy Sciencies 23:185-204.            Table 1 Rates of Growth of GDP per Capita, 1820–89 (Maddison 1994)
(annual average compound rate of growth)
 1820-70 1870-1913 1913-50 1950-73 1973-89
The European capitalist core and its offshoots
Austria 0.6 1.5 0.2 4.9 2.3
Belgium 1.4 1 0.7 3.5 2.0
Denmark 0.9 1.6 1.5 3.1 1.7
Finland 0.8 1.4 1.9 4.3 2.8
France 0.8 1.3 1.1 4.0 1.9
Germany 0.7 1.6 0.7 5.0 1.9
Italy 0.4 1.3 0.8 5.0 2.6
Netherlands 0.9 1.0 1.1 3.4 1.3
Norway 0.7 1.3 2.1 3.2 3.1
Sweden 0.7 1.5 2.1 3.1 1.7
United Kingdom 1.2 1.0 0.8 2.5 1.9
Australia 1.9 0.9 0.7 2.4 1.7
Canada 2.3 1.5 2.9 2.4
United States 1.2 1.8 1.6 2.2 1.6
Average 0.9 1.4 1.2 3.5 2.1
European periphery
Czechoslovakia 0.6 1.4 1.4 3.1 1.3
Greece 0.5 6.2 1.7
Hungary 1.2 1.2 3.5 1.2
Ireland 0.7 3.1 2.9
Portugal 0.3 1.4 5.6 1.7
Spain 0.6 1.4 0.2 5.1 1.8
Soviet Union 0.8 2.3 3.6 1.0
Average 0.6 1.0 1.1 4.3 1.7
Latin America
Argentina 1.9 0.7 2.1 -1.2
Brazil 0.2 0.3 2.0 3.8 1.7
Chile 1.7 1.2 1.5
Colombia 1.5 2.1 1.8
México 0.4 1.1 1.0 3.1 1.0
Peru 1.4 2.5 -1.2
Average 0.3 1.1 1.4 2.5 0.6
Asia
Bangladesh -0.3 -0.7 2.2
China 0.0 0.3 -0.5 3.7 5.7
India 0.0 0.3 -0.3 1.6 2.7
Indonesia 0.2 0.5 -0.2 2.1 3.4
Japan 0.1 1.4 0.9 8.0 3.0
Korea -0.2 5.2 6.4
Pakistan -0.3 1.8 2.8
Taiwan 0.4 6.2 6.1
Thailand 0.4 0.0 3.2 5.2
Average 0.1 0.6 -0.1 3.5 4.2Table 2:  Summary Growth Regressions, 1820-
1989          
Period
1820-1989 1820-1950 1950-1989
  a b a b a b
-0.0727 -0.043 0.11927* 0.1095* -0.344* -0.2745 Net Primary Exports per Worker
-(0.73) -(0.43) (1.87) (1.67) -(1.72) -(1.35)
Latin America   -0.38   0.13   -0.833*
    -(1.31)   (0.64)   -(1.68)
1870-1913 0.505885 0.5121 0.4972** 0.495**    
  (1.31) (1.33) (2.61) (0.25)    
1913-1950 0.2646 0.29269 0.2569 1.37    
  (0.73) (0.81) (1.44)      
1950-1973 2.43 2.45**     1.44** 1.44**
  (6.90) (6.96)     (3.84) (3.88)
1973-1989 0.997 1.01**        
  (2.82) (2.88)        
Constant 0.655** 0.6926** 0.633** 0.62** 1.69** 1.81**
  (2.27) (2.39) (4.45) (4.30) (6.34) (6.60)
Obs. 152 152 76 76 76 76
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.13
(t-student values)
Note:  * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level
Source: Author's construction using Maddison (1995) and WDI
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Argentina 53% 47%     
Brazil  100%       
Chile       100% 
Colombia  68%    18% 14%
México  15%    85% 
            
Australia 16% 2% 82%    
Canada 49%   34% 11% 6%
Finland 12%   84%  5%
Norway    18% 45% 20% 17%
Swedish 20% 10% 35% 20% 15%
Source: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Australia and Canada: Mitchell (1998);
Colombia, Norway and Sweden: Blömstrom and Meller (1991); Finland: Hjerppe
(1989)














Argentina -45.0% 5.6 /  7% -14.0%
Brazil -61.1% -6.0%
Chile -45.6% 7.0% -27.0%
Colombia -56.5% -2.0%
Mexico -51.5% 6.0% -17.6%
Australia -51.5% 20.0% -9.7%
Canada -58.3% 19.0% -25.1%
Denmark - 32.0% positive
Finland -46.3% -4.0%
Norway -38.0% 33.0% -2.6%
Sweden -55% 24.0% -4.0%
Sources: See Data Appendix
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